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ON paper, at least, the pragmatic revolt against arid conceptualism
in the law is perhaps one of the most significant developments of
modem jurisprudence. Pragmatists, functionalists, experimentalists-
"realists" of all shades: Holmes, Pound, Cook, Llewellyn, Radin,
Arnold, and Frank, to mention but a few-though flying different
banners, and employing different weapons of warfare, stormed the
citadel of the formalists, united in the belief that the meaning of legal
concepts is to be found in the consequences that they produce, that is,
in terms of human gains and deprivations.' Actually, the "storming"
was more on paper than on the battlefield, with victory claimed only
by those optimistic generals who take the long range view of the future
and blithely write off the present as having passed. The foot-soldiers
in the court-room and in the law schools are still engaged in heavy
combat; to them, the present is still very real, and the outcome of the
struggle by no means certain.
What is to be deplored, however, is less the lag between plan and
execution than the fact that the attack upon the formalists of the law
has been planned for only one front-the judicial. Holmes' critique of
the imbalance between "logic" and "experience," 2 Pound's aspersions
upon the "mechanical" in legal thinking,3 Cook's exposure of the
manipulative aspects of the legal syllogism,4 Llewellyn's plea for a
"look-see" on how the law actually works,' Radin's "legal realism,"O
Arnold's "folklore," 7 Frank's diatribes against the meaninglessness of
legal "rules,"" Morris Cohen's criticism of the "phonograph theory"
of the law,9 Felix Cohen's barbs on "transcendental nonsense" "0-all of
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these were, in the main, protests against the prevailing myths sur-
rounding judicial law. They stripped judges of any pretensions of
being without predilections, or of being anything other than human.
More important, they gave support to the view that a great deal of
judicial law was judge-nade and not judge-discovered, that judges ac-
tually legislated-that their so-called judicial "logic" was nothing more
than convenient trappings which concealed their real role as policy-
makers. Though expos6s, they were not intended to put a stop to judi-
cial policy-making. On the contrary, it was assumed that such policy-
making was, in the nature of things, inevitable. It was hoped, however,
that, by bringing the process to the level of consciousness, it could be
made more rational. Indeed--"policy-making," being a manifestation
of ethics, and the "rational" being the ideal of science, it was hoped that
in judicial policy-making would come a working partnership betveen
ethics and science, in which science would be given the opportunity to
illuminate the pathways of conflicting policy considerations.
But why not legislative policy-making as well? In an area in which
the scope of policy-making is considerably greater-in Congress, in the
state legislatures, in municipal councils, in administrative tribunals,-
can it be said that the working partnership is less needed? Assuming
much of judicial law to be nothing more than policy-making, is there
anything inherently unique in its make-up or in its impact upon human
relations to justify the realists in singling out this area of policy-making
as the major target of their attacks? Is one to assume that policy-
making on the legislative level is not in need of a good dose of the same
kind of "realism"? How explain so bold an attack on so narrow a
front?
Perhaps the basic reason is the ingrained habit of regarding law as
genuine only if it is labelled "judge-made." Thus, for example, the
view of Holmes that: "The prophecies of what the cours will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law;" n
and the position of John Chipman Gray that statutes are merely one
of many "sources of law." 12 To such realists, law is simply a forecast
of the manner in which the force of government will act upon an in-
dividual; and inasmuch as the impact of government is felt primarily
through the courts (so they assumed), they reasoned that law and the
decisions of courts are synonymous. This thought pattern is under-
standable when considered in the light of an ingrained tradition that
considered legislation as nothing more than a meddlesome intrusion
upon the mighty fortress of the common law.13 It becomes even more
understandable in view of the fact that the law schools, from whence
11. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAzv. L. Rzv. 457, 461 (197).
12. J. C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SoUnczs OF LAW § 191 (1909).
13. Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HAnv. L. REv. 383 (1903).
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many of the paper attacks of the realists have been launched, have for
so long been geared almost exclusively to the Langdellian case system
of teaching. Legislative law is dealt with not as one of the prime sources
of policy-making, but merely as a factor which a court must consider
in reaching a decision in a litigated issue.
But the fiction that courts are the only conduits through which the
force of government is carried to the individual ignores what should now
be obvious to any realist-that, in human experience, obedience to
legislative policy does not necessarily await the judicial green light.
Legislation calling for a "blackout" during an air-raid does not have
to be litigated before it is obeyed. And, needless to say, where there is
obedience there is impact. With Legislation fast becoming one of the
major courses in the curricula of our law schools, 4 with significant
departures being made from the traditional method of "case" instruc-
tion, with growing recognition of the fact that lawyers need to be
trained to deal with policy-making on all levels, whether judicial or
legislative '5-there is reason to hope that the fiction will not, like
Banquo's ghost, remain long to haunt us. At least, there are signs that
one of its major props-the schools-will no longer give continued
support to the "monopoly of the judicial point of view." 10
For the realist, then, policy-making is the common denominator of
both the judicial and legislative processes. But the similarity does not
stop here. If arid conceptualism is descriptive of policy-making on the
judicial level, the conceptualism is no less arid on the legislative; and,
if there is a crying need for "realism" in the one area, there is more
than sufficient evidence of such need in the other.
As early as 1921, Cardozo publicly voiced concern over the fact that
"courts are not helped as they could and ought to be in the adaptation
of law to justice." 17 "The duty must," he said, "be cast on some man
or group of men to watch the law in action, observe the manner of its
functioning, and report the changes needed when function is de-
ranged." 18 His plea for the creation of a Ministry of Justice was
prompted by the belief that, unless the effects of judge-made lav are
constantly measured and evaluated, that is, in terms of its impact
upon those who are affected, it becomes sterile and defeats the ends of
14. In the 1949-50 TEACHERS' DnrCTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION or AmE=ICA LAW
SCHOOLS, sixty-eight teachers are listed as handling or participating in courses in Legis-
lation. just a few years ago teachers of Legislation in law schools were virtually
unheard of.
15. See, for example, Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy,
52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943) ; J. Cohen, Crisis in Legal Education, 15 U. oF Cia. L. REV.
588 (1948).
16. This expression was, Ernst Freund's in his A Course in Statutes, 4 Am. L.
ScHooL REv. 273, 275 (1917).
17. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113 (1921).
18. Id. at 114.
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justice. The need is for the facts-the most accurately ascertainable
facts available--concerning the effects of such law in operation. With-
out such facts constantly available to the judges, there is danger that
socially undesirable policies will be perpetuated by the application of a
relentless logic, which places consistency above the demands of justice.
That other distinguished members of the profession have continued to
urge the establishment of a Ministry of Justice 9 is evidence that the
plea has gone unheeded. At best, however, it has been taken as one
of confession and avoidance---confession of the need, but avoidance of
a whole-hearted effort to cope with it.
On the judicial level, the need, then, is still with us; and the efforts
to cope with it recognize that judicial policy-making is blind unless it
is bottomed on reliable information concerning what the policy has
done, and reliable estimates of what it will do-in terms of human
gains and deprivations. It impliedly admits that this information can-
not with complete reliance be obtained from the briefs or arguments of
counsel representing the adversary interests involved; that this body
of knowledge must come from some reliable independent source. It
recognizes the need for accurate measuring rods of human behavior-
measuring rods the creation and application of which would tax the
ingenuity and skills of our best social scientists.
The blindness of policy-making and the need for scientific measuring
rods are no less evident on the legislative level. -  On this level, the chief
instrument for ascertaining the facts concerning the effects of past
social policy and the estimates of what a future policy will probably do
is the "hearing" before a legislative committee. It is before the com-
mittees--standing and special-that the "facts" concerning a pending
policy issue before Congress are paraded. Presumably, it is from a
careful weighing of these "facts" that a policy is bornm-at least so the
fiction goes. But what facts? Facts so reliable as to foreclose disputa-
tion? And who presents the facts? Impartial, independent students,
who are not only competent to gather them but also not afraid of letting
the "chips fall wher6 they may"? Or is it by representatives of ad-
versary interests who slant the facts to support the policy sought to be
enacted? In brief, what is the nature of the fact-finding process which
supposedly underlies legislative policy-making? Perhaps a clue to the
19. See FRA-N, CouRTs ON TRALa, 291 (1949) ; S. Glueck, The Ministry of Justice
and the Problem of Crime, 4 A.aMcAx REviEv 139 (1926); Lobinger, Precedent in
Legal Systems, 44 McH. L. REv. 955 (1946); Yntema, Legal Science and Reform, 34
Cot. L. RE. 207, 215-29 (1934).
20. This was recognized as early as 1823 by Bentham, who urged the creation of
a Ministry of Justice as a method for better preparing legislators for their tasks as policy-
makers. On this, see Pound, A .'finistry of Justice as a Means of Making Progress in
Medicine Available to Courts and Legislatures, 10 U. OF CL L. Rnv. 323, 331 et seq.
(1943).
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workings of this process-at least on the federal level-can be found
by examining its operation in connection with three of the most con-
troversial policy issues which faced the first session of the 81st Congress
-(1) the Taft-Hartley Act, (2) basing points, and (3) displaced per-
sons.
The Taft-Hartley issue involved, among other things, heated contro-
versies over what the Taft-Hartley Act actually accomplished in prac-
tice. The proponents of repeal claimed that the Act produced certain
results; those who advocated the retention of the Act denied that it
produced these results. There were large areas of agreement as to the
ultimate ends an appropriate Labor-Management Relations Act should
achieve; but much of the controversy was concerned with whether the
Taft-Hartley Act, as a means to these ends, did accomplish them dur-
ing its period of operation. For example, both sides publicly avowed
that legislation regulating labor-management relations should (1) not
discourage membership in labor unions; (2) improve the processes of
collective bargaining; (3) insure the greatest effectiveness of the con-
ciliation service; (4) lessen the amount of labor-management strife; (5)
eliminate Communists from positions of control in labor unions; (6)
increase the efficiency of the National Labor Relations Board; (7) be
impartially administered; and (8) provide an effective method for
settling national emergency disputes. But both sides were in heated
disagreement over whether the machinery of the Taft-Hartley Act
advanced or retarded these ends. The facts with respect to the accom-
plishments of the Act were in dispute.
How were these facts resolved-if at all? The chief forums made
available for this purpose were the Committees of the House and
Senate, to which bills calling for repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act were
referred for a "hearing"-a normal procedure for airing considerations
which underlie legislative policy decisions. Those familiar generally
with the workings of the hearing process agree that the hearings on
these bills followed rather conventional lines. Spokesmen for the pros
and cons-carefully screened and selected by the majority and minority
leadership on the Committee-were permitted to appear as "witnesses"
to "testify." In the main, these consisted of key governmental officials
charged with administering the Act, representatives of powerful man-
agement and labor groups, and independent "experts" in labor-man-
agement relations. Though considerably more informal than a judicial
proceeding involving the trial of an issue of fact, it is evident that a
certain flavor of the judicial prevailed at the hearings. The "witnesses"
were adversaries-parties in interest. Even the "experts" appear to
have been chosen for their particular slant on the issues at hand. The
chief method of "proof" was by testimonial-testimonials not only as to
what the law ought to be, but what the Taft-Hartley Act actually did.
[Vol. 59: .N6
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Additional major types of evidence included sporadic "case studies"
of experiences under the Act, opinions from newspaper editorials and
magazine articles, assumed facts, a few scattered statistics from which
conflicting inferences could be drawn, letters and telegrams from con-
stituents, the results of questionable questionnaires aimed at recording
group attitudes on labor policy, etc. But throughout the 1700 printed
pages upon which the House hearings were recorded, and throughout
the 3500-odd pages which were consumed on the Senate side, one looks
in vain for a reliable resolution of the conflicting versions of many of the
major "facts" upon which a great number of the conflicting policies
presumably were bottomed. Facts which should and could have been
resolved remained in the realm of disputation-each side presenting
competing hypotheses as to what they were, and then drawing logical,
but competing, policy conclusions with respect to them.2' There was
very little evidence which was aimed at reducing these hypothetical
fact constructs to relative certainty.
The use of testimonials is understandable, of course, in instances in
-which opinion is sought on the probable course of fuiture conduct. But
what of the above-mentioned facts in dispute that related to the past?
Many of them were, admittedly, difficult to establish. But this does not
mean that better methods than those used at the hearings were not
available for tracking many of them down-for reducing the area of
21. Note the conflicting views concerning the effects of the Taft-Hartley Act during
its period of operation:
(a) on whether it hampered union organizing-contrast the statement of Ira Mosher
of the NAM with that of Arthur J. Goldberg, General Counsel, CIO. Hearings before
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2336 and 439
(1949) (Hereafter Hearings).
(b) on whether it improved the processes of collective bargaining-contrast the
statement of Ira Mosher of the NAM with that of Professor Nathan P. Feinsinger.
Hearings 2389 and 2571.
(c) on whether it increased the effectiveness of the government conciliation serice-
contrast the statement of Almon Roth, President of the San Francisco Employers Council,
with that of Walter Munro. Hearings 537 and 2072 ct seq.
(d) on whether it lessened the amount of labor-management strife-contrast the
statement of Almon Roth with that of A. F. Whitney of the Brotherhood of Railway
Trainmen. Hearings 592 and 2748-9.
(e) on whether it eliminated Communists from positions of control in labor unions
-contrast the statement of Robert N. Denham with that of Secretary of Labor Tobin
and Senator Humphrey. Hearings 1076 and 342.
(f) on whether the separation of functions of the Board and the General Counsel
increased the efficiency of the NLRB-contrast the statement of George B. Christensen,
Attorney, with that of Arthur J. Goldberg. Hearings 2651 and 481.
(g) on whether it assured the impartial administration of the Act-contrast the
statement of Ira Mosher with that of Arthur J. Goldberg. Hearings 2396 and 482.
(h) on whether it provided an effective method for settling national emergency dis-
putes-contrast the statement of Senator Forrest Donnell with that of William H. Davis.
Hearings 924 and 893.
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disputation to the barest minimum. As clumsy and as crude as many
of the present tools of the social sciences are, no one can seriously doubt
that they could have yielded findings considerably more reliable than
those obtained at the hearings. Given the opportunity, experiments
for obtaining the answers to such fact controversies could have been
designed by competent social scientists. The methods used and the
findings that resulted could have been subjected to as rigorous a
critical scrutiny as one can apply to experiments in the physical
sciences.
This assumes that the basic purpose of a legislative hearing is to get
at the facts, to make the policy decisions as rational as possible. It is
doubtful, however, whether such an assumption is justified. Not in-
frequently, the hearing is used merely as a political sounding board
for legislative policy-makers. It provides them with an opportunity to
ascertain what power groups support or .oppose a certain legislative
proposal; it gives them an opportunity to assess not only their strength
of conviction, but their relative power; it serves as an instrument for
calculating the political advantages and disadvantages of casting a
"yea" or "nay" vote if and when the measure reaches the floor. Not
infrequently, too, one finds the hearing used as a device to be manipu-
lated by those who, through party government and a system of senior-
ity, control the machinery and the personnel of the committee. The
manipulation may take many forms. The hearing might, for example,
be used as a method by which those already committed to a legislative
policy give that policy an aura of well-reasoned respectability by mak-
ing it appear that the decision was arrived at on rational grounds. This
method is familiar to policy-makers on the judicial level who often
endeavor to buttress a decision with judicial logic long after that
decision was reached on other than logical grounds. One will find all of
these purposes-and more-operative in the hearings on the Taft-
Hartley issue.
Those who control the committee machinery may also use the hear-
ings as a device to suppress facts salient to a policy issue because of the
fear that an exposure of the facts might lend support to a policy which
they do not wish to be enacted into law. There were at least two ex-
amples of this in the 81st Congress. The first involved the controversy
over displaced persons legislation. The proponents of a liberalized
Displaced Persons Act found that it was extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to get before the Senate Judiciary Committee (and, therefore,
the public) data to show the inadequacies of existing laws, particularly
as they affected the European Catholic, Protestant and Jewish victims
of the last war. Sixteen Senate bills concerning this subject were in-
troduced during the first session-eight in January, two in February,
four in March, one in April and one in May. No public hearings on any
[Vol. 59: 886
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of these bills were held until the 26th of July. On that date, it was made
clear by the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator McCarran,
that the hearings would not be concerned with the immediate problem
of the European displaced persons, but with displaced and helpless
persons all over the world-the Pakistanis, the Arabs, the Greeks, the
Chinese, etc. As a result, those who had data to present concerning the
European displaced persons situation, even the members of the Dis-
placed Persons Commission who were administering the Act, were for
a long time denied the opportunity to appear before the Committee.
22
The second example related to the much fought-over "basing points"
issue, a controversy brought to a head by the introduction of several
bills purporting to allow the continuation of certain restrictive trade
practices which had been outlawed by the Supreme Court. The ma-
nipulatory aspects of the hearing process were dramatized in a speech on
the House floor by Representative Patman of Texas, an outspoken
opponent of the moratorium measure. In complaining that no oppor-
tunity was had for adequate hearings on the proposed measure, he
stated:
"I grant that this might happen in Russia where they have a dic-
tatorship, or it could have happened under Hitler or under Musso-
lini, but I am surprised that here in the U.S.A., the United States of
America, that the gentleman would try to force a bill of this magni-
tude through the House of Representatives and through Congress
without any public and printed hearings. Then, when we come to
discussing it, the committee that is in favor of the bill has 3 hours,
and I am given but 20 minutes in which to oppose it. . . .[T]he
committee owes us the duty of holding hearings and bringing those
hearings back in here so that we will know what every word, and
every phrase, and every sentence of every paragraph means. They
have not done that. That is not the American way of enacting
laws." 23
One should add that when those who by control of the hearing process
not only suppress the facts, but by doing so draw from it and propagate
the false inference that "silence means acquiescence," then the manip-
ulation yields double dividends.
24
22. Despite the absence of witnesses prepared to demonstrate the urgency of lib-
eralized displaced persons legislation, it was noted in the Washington Post, July 28, 1949,
p. 4, that: "McCarran said at a hearing of his Immigration Subcommittee that he saw
'no reason' for rushing changes in the present D.P. law, labeled discriminatory by Presi-
dent Truman, nor for taking any action to increase the D.P. quotas until next May."
23. 95 CoxG. REc., PARr 7, 9040, 9041 (1949).
24. An example of the draving of such an inference of acquiescence may be found
in the minority report on the Hearings on S. 249, the bill to repeal the Taft-Hartey Act.
In commenting on the desirability of continuing the provision which outlawved mass
picketing, the report states: "There -was very little testimony against this Taft-Hartley
provision at the 1949 hearings and no specific instances alleging it had vorked an injustice
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If these examples of the legislative hearing process were the excep-
tion rather than the rule, there would not be too great a cause for con-
cern, even though the three legislative policy issues were of widespread
importance. One suspects, however, that accurate, objective fact-
finding to illuminate the pathways of proposed policy decisions is, by
and large, not the chief function of the hearing process as it is used
today. Exceptions there are, of course, but their existence as exceptions
would seem merely to strengthen the suspicion of the general rule.
If this is true, what other reliable instruments of fact-finding are
available to the legislative policy-makers? The Legislative Reference
Services on the House and Senate side are not geared to undertake such
research, their main function being to gather secondary reference
materials and to assist in the technical job of bill drafting. 21 Occasion-
ally Congress authorizes committees to undertake specialized studies
of problems which are ripe for legislation. Often this is taken as an in-
vitation for junkets by legislators to obtain information "first hand."
If the problem is in any way complicated, this information can at best
be little more than quick impressionistic reactions. Sometimes com-
mittee staff "experts" are sent out into the field to gather pertinent in-
formation. Many of these so-called "experts" are incompetent to per-
form a first rate job of research, especially if it involves the study of
complex social, economic and psychological phenomena. Among them
it is common to find lawyers, self-styled economists, journalists, public
relations men, and political "hangers-on," who have had no specialized
training in the complicated fields of the social sciences. But even with
these defects, the number of authorized field studies is exceedingly
small; and upon examination one will find many of them nothing more
than decentralized hearings with the same weaknesses that one ob-
serves in the hearing process generally. Very rarely one finds a study to
match the quality of the TNEC reports, or the quality of the per-
sonnel that was engaged to prepare them. Even rarer are legislative
studies designed to examine the "before and after" of laws in operation.
It is interesting to recall, for example, the intensity of the argu-
ments concerning the efficacy of the Administrative Procedure Bill.
The predictions of what the proposal, if enacted, would do, were
countless. The bill was finally passed and has been on the books
for approximately four years. Despite the tremendous importance
of this measure, one has yet to find evidence of any serious attempt
by Congress to ascertain whether any of these predictions came
true, or whether the Act achieved the purposes for which it was
were presented to the committee." SEN. REP. No. 99, PAiT 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 24
(1949).
25. For a discussion of the work of the Legislative Reference Services, see Hearirgs
before the $oint Committee on the Organization of Congress on H. Con. Res. 18, 79th
Cong., Ist Sess. 413-30, 455-66 (1945).
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passed.2 What seems to give impetus to an investigation of law in
action is some dramatic dislocation or disaster which arouses wide-
spread public indignation. Thus it took nearly one hundred deaths
resultirig from the use of "Elixir Sulfanilimide" in 1938 to convince
Congress that the 1906 Federal Food and Drug Act did not offer the
consuming public sufficient protection. -
There are, of course, notable instances of significant studies under-
taken by the Executive arm of the Government-for example, the work
of the Division of Planning and Surveys in the Department of Agricul-
ture, the National Resources Planning Board, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the Federal Reserve Board; and by such private agencies as
the Brookings Foundation and the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search. These can and have been utilized by Congress in its policy-
making deliberations. But one would surmise that the total of such
studies would constitute only an infinitesimal part of the almost count-
less policy issues that are considered and acted upon during each ses-
sion of Congress. It seems fairly safe to assume that, by and large, the
I"noise principle" as suggested by William James is still the dominant
operative force in legislative policy-making. As paraphrased by T. V.
Smith, the principle is to "wait to see who hollers, and then relieve the
hollering as best you can to see who else hollers." 2
It should be evident from all of this that, not only on the judicial
level, but on the legislative level as well, there is great need for better
fact-finding methods if policy-making is to become more rational. If
something akin to a Ministry of Justice is needed to assist the courts
in gaging the efficacy of past and proposed judicial policy-making,
something similar but of considerably greater scope is needed for leg-
islative policy-making. In its ideal form, it would require a vast army
of our very best scientists-social and physical-who would be author-
ized to undertake an untold number of studies: diagnostic, to determine
whether action is required; prognostic, to forecast trends and plan
future needs; evaluative, to assess the efficacy of existing programs;
26. It is still true that "the need for a continuous testing apparatus is apparent. The
recommendation of the Attorney General's Committee that an Office of Federal Adminis-
trative Procedure be established to launch continuous scientific studies of the efficacy of
established administrative procedures is as salutary now as it was when originally made.
The creation of such machinery would do much to dissipate the apprehensions of those
who doubt the purpose of the Act to be the improvement of the administrative process.
Even more, it would provide the means to dispel, once and for all, whatever errors the
critics of the Act may have made in predicting that its provisions will not prove workable."
See J. Cohen, Legislative Injustice and Supremacy "of Law," 26 Nmv. L. REv. 323, 345
(1947).
27. See Cavers, The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938; 7Ts Lcgislatlke History
and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAw & CoNrad. Pron. Z 20 (1939).
28. Smith, Custom, Gossip, Legislation, 16 SocrAL Foncas 24, 34 (1937).
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fact studies, to illuminate the pathways of alternative policy choices.11
In brief we must use all phases of applied research which would permit
a transplantation of our best scientific knowledge to the field of policy-
making.
Of course this is asking for the moon, but it is a target towards which
to shoot. Its realization in its ideal form would obviously be hampered
by many conditions, the most serious of them being: (1) the unwilling-
ness of some policy-makers to assume the "rational" as an ethical
postulate; (2) the undeveloped state of the social sciences; and (3) the
fear that science will dictate what people should want. But the first
should not deter one from the pursuit of the "rational" as a basic value
in a democratic society, Nor need the second factor cause one to shy
away from whatever contributions, however few, the social sciences
have to make. And there have been a few, despite the attacks of those
who refuse to recognize the worth of any advance that does not measure
up in magnitude to the accomplishments of the physical sciences. Even
in its primitive state, social science today can go far beyond the capac-
ity of our average legislative policy-makers and their coteries of ad-
visers in presenting a fairly accurate picture of the salient factors, e.g.,
conditions, resources and possible alternatives, which are germane to
the making of rational policy judgments." Finally, as to the fear that
science will become the dictator and not the adviser, the following ob-
servation should provide a modicum of assurance:
"cno science tells us what to do with the knowledge that con-
stitutes the science. Science only provides a car and a chauffeur for
us. It does not directly, as science, tell us where to drive. The car
and the chauffeur will take us into the ditch, over the precipice,
against a stone wall, or into the highlands of age-long human
aspirations with equal efficiency. If we agree as to where we want to
go and tell the driver our goal, he should be able to take us there by
any one of a number of possible routes, the costs and conditions of
each of which the scientist should be able to explain to us. When
these alternatives have been made clear, it is also a proper function
of the scientist to devise the quickest and most reliable instrument
for detecting the wishes of his passengers. But, except in his ca-
pacity as one of the passengers, the scientist who serves as naviga-
tor and chauffeur has no scientific privilege or duty to tell the rest
of the passengers what they should want." 31
29. This follows, somewhat, the classificatory scheme developed by the Columbia
University Bureau of Applied Research. See Merton, Thc Role of Applied Social Scietlce
in the Formation of Policy: A Research Memorandum, 16 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIrNCg 161,
174 (1949).
30. On this point, see Shils, Social Science and Social Policy, 16 PILOSOPHnY OF
ScIENcs 219, 236-7 (1949).
31. LUNDBERG, CAN ScIENcE SAVE Us 31 (1947). See also Benoit-Smullyar, Value
Judgments and the Social Sciences, 42 JOUPNAL OF PHILOSOPHIn 197, 209 (1945).
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TOWARDS REALISM IN LEGISPRUDENCE
Realism in jurisprudence calls for a working arrangement between
science and judicial law. Realism in legisprudence calls for a similar
arrangement with legislative law. Both are but facets of a single pur-
pose-the illumination of the pathways of policy-making with the
best light that human knowledge and experience can possibly provide.
Both assume that "law" can properly be understood only by a con-
stant examination of the nature of its impact upon those whom it
affects. But neither necessarily minimizes the tremendous difficulties
in the way of arranging a rendezvous between science and policy-
making. Some policy-makers may resent the intrusion of science out
of fear that it will expose their hand, or invade an area which they re-
gard as their exclusive domain; 32 others may try to exploit it only
when it will bolster or adorn a decision reached on other grounds; 13
still others, impressed only with the immaturity of the social sciences,
are frightened at the risk of having a rendezvous with a minor. Difficul-
ties there are, to be sure, but the approach seems to hold the only hope
for those who still cling to the pursuit of reason as the sine qua vonl of
the democratic way of life.
32. On this latter point, see Shils, supra note 30, at 234-5.
33. This is the view of HANs J. MORoGNTHAU in his SCMNTIFIC MAN vs. Powsn
PoLITIcs 219 (1946). Unfortunately, Professor Morgenthau holds out no more hope than
this for science in relation to policy-maing.
1950]
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